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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 
vs. 
9851 
TERRY D. LOUDEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The appellant has appealed from his conviction of 
second degree burglary in violation of 76-9-3, U. C. A. 
1953, upon jury trial in the Third Judicial District, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of 
facts, as being the evidence of the case when construed 
most favorably to the conviction. 
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During the night of July 22-23, 1962, the Harmon City 
Shopping Center in Salt Lake County was burglarized (R. 
54, 55) . Various display cases were rummaged and a Pepsi-
Cola machine located in the premises was broken into and 
$10~00 removed (R. 65). In addition, one .22 caliber pistol 
(Exhibit 1), two watches (Exhibits 2 and 3), and a Polar-
oid camera (Exhibit 4) were taken from the building. 
The exhibits (1, 2, 3, and 4) were identified as the 
items taken from the store as the result of the burglary. 
During the course of the investigation into the bur-
glary, the Salt Lake County Sheriff's department received 
an anonymous tip, and as a result attempted to locate the 
defendant and his companion (R. 74). Two deputy sheriffs 
went to the Spiking Motel where appellant was staying. 
They induced the manager to allow them into the room 
occupied by the appellant and his companion (R. 75). Dur-
ing this search, all the officers noted was a loaded revolver 
in the bureau, which serial number matched the revolver 
taken during the Harmon City burglary (R. 75). There-
after, the deputies left the room and waited outside for the 
return of appellant. The appellant returned with his com-
panion and entered the motel room (R. 76). Thereafter, 
the two deputies approached the room. Although they had 
drawn their guns as they approached the room, they put 
them back in their holsters before going in the room. The 
door to the room was open (R. 83). The deputies asked 
appellant and his companion if they could come in and look 
around (R. 76), to which appellant and his companion in-
dicated they could and that they had no objections (R. 76). 
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According to one officer, the reply was, "Yes, you can come 
in and look around" (R. 76). Thereafter, the deputies asked 
if they could search appellant and his companion, and the 
appellant indicated it was all right (R. 84, 85). During the 
course of the search, the gun was confiscated, and in addi-
tion, the two watches (Exhibits 2 and 3). 
Subsequently, the appellant was taken down to the 
County jail. Some two days later appellant was questioned 
by the police (R. 78). At the time of questioning, the ap~ 
pellant said he gave the Polaroid camera to the landlady at 
the Spiking Motel for rent due (R. 79). With reference to 
the Harmon City burglary, appellant told the police (R. 
78, 80) : 
"He said that he went there about 2 :30 in the 
morning, pried open the back door and looked 
around for the safe and couldn't find it; had rum-
maged through the cashier's desk and couldn't find 
any money there, and so he took a pistol, Polaroid 
camera, various watches and some crow bars." 
No promises of leniency or anything else were made 
at that time (R. 79). Thereafter, some promises of leniency 
were made to induce confessions to other crimes not the 
subject of the instant prosecution; and further, a written 
confession was taken but not used. Only the oral statement 
was used which was given prior to any promises of len-
iency. 
Thereafter, the officers picked up the camera from 
the motel landlady (R. 80). 
Prior to trial, the appellant made a motion to suppress 
all the evidence found in the appellant's motel room on the 
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grounds that it was secured by an illegal search and seizure 
(R. 8). The motion was heard with the trial court receiv-
ing the appellant's testimony and a transcript of evidence 
of the deputy sheriff at the preliminary hearing. (Appen-
dix to record.) The motion was apparently denied (R. 
68). Thereafter, during the trial, appellant renewed his 
motion to suppress, and further requested an out of jury 
hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of the confession 
and on search and seizure. The court refused the out of 
court hearing on the confession, although counsel stated 
the substance of the expected testimony to the judge, and 
apparently only wanted the State's witnesses to be sub-
jected to cross-examination before the jury heard them (R. 
69). Although the appellant took exception to the pro-
cedure, it is not clear whether his exception related only 
to the confession upon which he had already, through coun-
sel, expressed himself, or to the issue of search and seizure 
(R. 72). 
No evidence on the voluntariness of the confession 
was put to the jury by the appellant. 
Finally, appellant preserved no part of the record on 
his requested instructions and apparently took no excep-
tions to the court's failure, if any, to give such instructions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
NO REVERSIBLE ERROR WAS COMMITTED 
IN REFUSING APPELLANT AN OUT OF 
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COURT HEARING ON THE ADMISSIBILITY 
OF HIS STATEMENT TO THE POLICE SINCE: 
A. THE ORAL STATEMENT ADMITTED 
WAS AN ADMISSION, NOT A CONFES-
SION. 
B. APPELLANT PRESENTED THE NATURE 
OF HIS TESTIMONY TO THE COURT, 
AND THE COURT DETERMINED TO 
PLACE IT BEFORE THE JURY, THUS 
AFFORDING APPELLANT HIS INITIAL 
JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION. 
C. APPELLANT DID NOT MAKE CLEAR HIS 
OBJECTION TO THE PROCEDURE FOL-
LOWED WITH REFERENCE TO THE AD-
MISSION OF THE STATEMENT AND 
MADE NO OBJECTION TO THE ADMIS-
SION OF THE STATEMENT WHEN PRE-
SENTED TO THE JURY. 
A. The appellant contends that the trial court erred 
in not granting a preliminary hearing, out of the presence 
of the jury, to rule on the admissibility of the appellant's 
oral statement to the police. The appellant apparently 
considered the statement to be a confession. The statement 
is set out on page 79 of the record, and generally is as fol-
lows: 
"Q. All right. What was said; what was the 
conversation in regard to this Harmon City Shop-
ping Center incident? 
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"A. Well, Mr. Lowden told me that he had 
given the Polaroid camera to the landlady at the 
Spiking Motel for rent that was due; or she was 
going to hold this until he had paid the rent. 
"Q. Did he tell you anything as to where he 
got the Polaroid camera or these other articles? 
"A. Yes. And subsequent to him telling me 
about the camera, he told me all about the job at 
Harmon City. 
"Q. What did he say? 
"A. He said that he went there about 2 :30 in 
the morning, pried open the back door and looked 
around for the safe and couldn't find it; had rum-
maged through the cashier's desk and couldn't find 
any money there, and so he took a pistol, Polaroid 
camera, various watches and some crow bars." 
It is admitted that the rule laid down in State v. Crank, 
105 Utah 332, 142 P. 2d 178 (1943), requires that the trial 
court, independently of the jury, review all the evidence of 
the voluntariness of a confession, and then if it determines 
the confession to be voluntary, it may admit both the state-
ment and the circumstances surrounding the taking of the 
statement for the jury's consideration. 1 
However, this rule is not applicable to the case of an 
admission. Thus, in State v. Masato Karumai, 101 Utah 
592, 126 P. 2d 1047 (1942), this court noted: 
"A confession is the admission of guilt by the 
defendant of all the necessary elements of the crime 
lThe holding of the Crank case and State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450, 229 
P. 2d 2 8 9 ( 1 9 51) , that the jury should not be instructed to disregard 
the confession if they determine it involuntary is in doubt. Rogers V. 
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). 
ff·· 
~ ;,;--..:.-_:.:_c,:.·,=·,·~ 
£---·- ·-
~·~c.· 
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of which he is charged, including the necessary acts 
and intent. An admission merely admits some fact 
which connects or tends to connect the defendant 
with the offense but not with all the elements of the 
crime. State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P. 2d 
1010; People v. Fowler, 178 Cal. 657, 174 P. 892; 
State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P. 2d 542; State v. 
Stevens, 60 Mont. 390, 199 P. 256. 
"Although there are some cases to the con-
trary, the great weight of authority and the better-
reasoned cases hold that before receiving an admis-
sion-as distinguished from a confession-in evi-
dence, it is not necessary that a preliminary show-
ing be made to the effect that the statement was 
voluntary." 
In that case the court commented with references to 
the statement taken: 
"In the statement testified to there was no ex-
press admission of the guilt of any crime of which 
defendant was charged. Construed against defen-
dant in its strongest possible light, it was, at most, 
merely an admission that the defendant killed the 
deceased because deceased was no good. * * *" 
Applying that case to the instant facts, it is apparent 
that the testimony of the police officer as to the statement 
made by the appellant amounted to no more than a state-
ment of admissions. There was no admission of the intent 
to commit a criminal offense at the time of the breaking, 
nor any complete admission of total responsibility. What 
was said was merely several factual statements as to what 
was done. This is not sufficient to constitute a confession, 
and, consequently, the failure to grant an out of court 
hearing was not error. 
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B. It is submitted that no reversible error exists even 
if the appellant's statement to the police is deemed an ad-
mission, since a hearing was held out of court where the 
judge heard the nature of the appellant's evidence, although 
through counsel, and, thereafter determined to present the 
matter to the jury (R. 69). Since the judge thereafter 
determined to present the statement to the jury, he, in 
effect, determined that there was not sufficient basis to 
the appellant's objection to rule as a matter of law that the 
confession was involuntary. This being so, the appellant 
had all he was entitled to from an out of court hearing. 
State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450, 229 P. 2d 289 ( 1951). He 
could thereafter, if he so decided, raise the same facts be-
fore the jury-however, he did not do so. Consequently, 
it cannot be claimed that any prejudice resulted to the ap-
pellant. 
C. At the time of the out of court hearing on how 
the defendant's statement should be handled, the question 
of the evidence as to search and seizure and how it should 
be handled was also considered. The record reflects the 
following (R. 72) : 
"MR. ROSS: That's what I want to do now 
is clean up the record. Then it's your ruling, is it 
not, that my-that you will hear the evidence both 
as to the illegal search-that all evidence of this 
witness will come in and then you will hear any 
motions I have as to the illegal search and seizure? 
"THE COURT: And as to the alleged confes-
sion, if any. And those motions may be argued out-
side the presence of the jury and before the matter 
is submitted to the jury. 
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"MR. ROSS: All right. I'll take my exception 
to that at this time." 
The appellant did not make it clear as to what he was 
objecting to. The discussions immediately before related 
to search and seizure problems. Since the appellant did 
not clearly object to the procedure to be followed as to the 
alleged confession, he cannot be heard at the appellate stage 
to complain. State v. Mathews, 13 Utah 2d 391, 394, 375 
P. 2d 392 (1962). 
Additionally, it is submitted that the appellant waived 
any contention as to the voluntariness of the statement he 
gave the deputy sheriff. No evidence was presented of any 
kind to rebut the testimony of the sheriff that all promises 
of immunity came subsequent to the statement received in 
evidence. Nor was any objection made to the admission of 
the sheriff's testimony. Consequently, it is submitted the 
appellant waived any right to complain. State v. Fraser, 
107 Utah 454, 154 P. 2d 752 (1944). 
It is submitted, therefore, that there is no basis for 
reversal on the issue of appellant's statement to the police. 
POINT II. 
NO BASIS FOR REVERSAL EXISTS ON THE 
CLAIM OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZ-
URE. 
The appellant contends in Point 2 of his brief that the 
trial court erred in refusing to grant the defendant's mo-
tion to suppress and in admitting into evidence the prop-
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erty seized by deputy sheriffs during the search of the 
motel room in which the appellant was staying. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has ruled 
that evidence procured by an unlawful search and seizure 
may not be used in state courts, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 
643 (1961), the determination of what conduct is "unrea-
sonable" is still a matter for state determination. In Com-
monwealth v. Bosurgi, 190 Atl. 304 (Pa. 1963), the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court noted : 
"In passing upon the 'reasonableness' of a 
search and seizure, a preliminary and most impor-
tant, question is whether Mapp requires that state 
courts determine the 'reasonableness' of such search 
and seizure in accordance with federal or state stan-
dards. To that question Mapp gives no direct an-
swer. However, a study of Mapp would indicate 
that, at least by implication, state courts are still 
free to apply their own, rather than the federal, 
criteria of 'reasonableness'." 
See also Commonwealth v. Richards, 198 Pa. 
Super. 42, 182 A. 2d 293 (1962). 
Other courts have also followed the Pennsylvania rea-
soning. State v. Smith, 37 N. J. 481, 181 A. 2d 761, 767 
( 1962); People v. Mickelson, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 380 P. 2d 
658 ( 1963); People v. Ruiz, 196 Cal. App. 2d 695, 16 Cal. 
Rptr. 855; People v. Tyler, 193 Cal. App. 728, 14 Cal. Rptr. 
610. 
Consequently, in determining whether the action in this 
instance was reasonable, federal standards are not wholly 
applicable. 
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In the instant case, the police officers acting upon an 
anonymous tip, approached the motel where the appellant 
was staying and requested the manager to allow them to 
look around the appellant's room. The manager allowed 
the officers to search the room. The officers found a pistol 
taken from the Harmon City burglary (Exhibit 1). There-
after, they left the room and waited for appellant and his 
companion to return. Shortly after appellant returned 
(and again construing the evidence most favorable to the 
conviction, State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P. 2d 865 
(1959)), the police approached the room with drawn guns, 
but holstered them before reaching and entering the ap-
pellant's ·room. The door to the room was open and the 
police first identified themselves and asked if they could 
enter, to which they received an affirmative reply from 
the occupants, "Yes, you can come in and look around" (R. 
76). Thereafter, the officers entered and asked the ap-
pellant if his person could be searched and he agreed. Ex-
hibit 1, which the officers already knew about, was seized. 
Exhibits 2 and 3, which the officers had not discovered, 
were also taken. Exhibit 4 was not discovered by virtue of 
any unlawful search. The room where the appellant was 
located and staying was rented to a Mr. Carrell who paid 
the rent (R. 101), although it was apparently due at the 
time of the search. 
In 79 C. J. S., Searches and Seizures, § 98, it is noted: 
"One who seeks affirmative relief on the 
ground that officers violated his constitutional 
rights in making a search has the burden of estab-
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lishing facts from which it will affirmatively ap-
pear that his rights were invaded." 
Consequently, the appellant had the duty of demon-
strating the illegality of the search. In the first instance 
as to the right of the police to search with the manager's 
consent, Varon, Searches and Seizures, Vol. 1, p. 439 
(1961) notes: 
"In the case of owners, landlords and tenants 
there have been many decisions in the various 
courts throughout the nation that define the rights 
of each and although the greater weight of author-
ity appears to hold that owners of property and 
landlords under leases and tenancy agreements have 
the right to consent to a search of their property, 
there is a question that is meritoriously raised when 
the rights of the tenants in possession are absolute." 
The appellant offered no evidence to show that the 
motel manager had no right to allow inspection or search 
of the premises. Where the room was actually let to some-
one other than appellant, where the rent was apparently 
due, and where no evidence was introduced as to the terms 
of occupancy, it certainly may be concluded that the ap-
pellant has not carried his burden of showing the landlady 
had no authority to permit the room to be searched. In 
People v. Dillard, 168 Cal. App. 2d 158, 335 P. 2d 702 
( 1959), the court noted as to a similar situation: 
"As her first ground for reversal appellant 
urges that the entry of the officers into her apart-
ment during her absence was in violation of her 
constitutional rights and that the evidence produced 
against her was obtained through an illegal search 
and seizure. In this regard, as heretofore set forth, 
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when the officers arrived at appellant's apartment 
they knocked on the door several times and receiv-
ing no response they approached the manager who 
in response to their request opened the door for 
them. When they entered they discovered the mari-
huana seeds on the bed. Appellant does not contend 
that the manager had no authority to enter the 
apartment, and the manager testified that he volun-
tarily permitted the officers to enter. On the oc-
casion of the first visit of the officers to appellant's 
apartment, there was no search. The contraband 
was plainly visible when the officers entered. The 
situation here presented is analogous to that exist-
ing in People v. Ambrose, 155 Cal. App. 2d 513, at 
page 523, 318 P. 2d 181, at page 188, wherein we 
said: 
" 'The officers asked the hotel manager for 
authority to enter the room whereupon he opened 
the door and let them in. The question of consent 
is to be determined by the trier of fact (citing 
cases). Upon the authority of People v. Gorg, 45 
Cal. 2d 776, 783, 291 P. 2d 469, and People v. Cari-
tativo, 46 Cal. 2d 68, 73, 292 P. 2d 513, we are 
persuaded that appellant's contention must be re-
jected. In the cited case it is held that where the 
officers have acted in good faith with the consent 
of a homeowner or landlord in conducting a search, 
and the latter believed they had joint control over 
the premises, and the right to enter them, evidence 
so obtained cannot be excluded merely because the 
officers may have made a reasonable mistake as to 
the extent of the owner or landlord's authority. See 
also People v. Silva, 140 Cal. App. 2d 791, 794-795, 
295 P. 2d 942.'" 
Consequently, it is submitted appellant has failed to 
show an illegal search of the premises. 
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Secondly, it is submitted that even if the original 
search were invalid, for several reasons appellant may not 
complain. 
First, it is submitted that if the first search was illegal, 
the subsequent search was made with the consent of the 
appellant, and having consented to the subsequent search 
wherein the gun was seized, he thereby ratified what had 
been done before. In People v. Allen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 267, 
298 P. 2d 714 (1956), the California court so held. The 
appellant's reliance upon Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920), is not applicable, since 
in that case, after the illegal search, the internal revenue 
service sought to subpoena the records discovered by the 
search. There was no question of a voluntary relinquish-
ment or ratification by subsequent conduct. Certainly, 
there is nothing unreasonable about holding that consent 
to search waives any previous illegality occurring by a 
prior search where the same contraband is on the premises. 
It is just as probable that consent would have been given 
before, under the same circumstances, had the appellant 
been present. Consequently, no logical basis exists not to 
find a ratification or waiver. 
Nor is there any basis to the claim that there was no 
consent to the second search. The question of consent or 
no consent is primarily a matter of fact to be determined 
by the trial court before ruling on the admissibility of the 
evidence, and hence the legality of the search. People v. 
Fischer, 49 Cal. 2d 442, 317 P. 2d 967. The only real issue 
is whether the evidence before the court would not as a 
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matter of law support a conclusion that the appellant con-
sented to the search. 
It is recognized that consent must be freely given and 
not merely acquiesced in by the person whose premises or 
person is being searched. Johnson v. United States, 333 
U. S. 10 (1948). However, in the instant case, the police 
requested permission to search and received it before ever 
going about the search. Nor did the appellant merely ac-
quiesce in the officers' request. On the contrary, an af-
firmative invitation was made to the police to look around. 
Although the police had originally drawn their guns, they 
were holstered before entering and requesting permission 
to search. In People v. Torres, 158 Cal. App. 2d 213, 322 
P. 2d 300 (1958), the court noted the following facts: 
"The facts bearing upon this narrow issue may 
be stated briefly. At approximately 6 :00 p.m. on 
March 19, 1957, Officer King of the Narcotics Di-
vision of the Los Angeles Police Department was in-
formed by Sergeant Bitterhoff of the Robbery Di-
vision that a man named Tony residing at 136 West 
69th Street was selling narcotics. At approximately 
9 :45 p.m. on March 19, 1957, Officer King was 
standing in front of the residence at the given ad-
dress when appellant (whose nickname was Tony) 
opened the door and came out. The officers identi-
fied themselves as police officers and stated to ap-
pellant that they had information that he was using 
and dealing in narcotics. He denied the accusatory 
statement. The officers then asked him whether 
'it would be all right if we'd look in the house.' Ap-
pellant answered, 'Yes, go ahead.' " 
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Based thereon, the court ruled the search voluntary, 
commenting: 
"A search of a house with the express, free and 
voluntary consent of a householder suspected of 
possessing narcotics is neither unreasonable nor 
unlawful. It follows that contraband found and 
seized in the course of such a search may lawfully 
and properly be received in evidence against the ac-
cused. People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 2d 45, 301 P. 2d 
241; People V. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751, 290 P. 2d 
852; People v. Hood, 149 Cal. App. 2d 836, 309 P. 
2d 135. It is true, as pointed out in People v. 
Michael, supra, that one need not forcibly resist 
an officer's assertion of authority to search, but if 
he freely consents to a search, then neither the 
search nor the seizure of evidence found in the 
course thereof is unreasonable. As the court there 
stated ( 45 Cal. 2d at page 753, 290 P. 2d at page 
854), 'Whether in a particular case an apparent 
consent was in fact voluntarily given or was in 
submission to an express or implied assertion of 
authority, is a question of fact to be determined in 
the light of all the circumstances.' To the same 
effect are People v. Lujan, 141 Cal. App. 2d 143, 
296 P. 2d 93, and People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 
291 P. 2d 469. Since the question is one of fact pri-
marily for the trial court's determination, the find-
ing of that court, supported by substantial evidence, 
is binding upon an appellate court. People v. Hood, 
supra, 149 Cal. App. 2d 836, 838, 309 P. 2d 135; 
People v. Allen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 267, 281, 298 P. 
2d 714; People v. Smith, 141 Cal. App. 2d 399, 402, 
296 P. 2d 913." 
See also People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 2d 45, 301 P. 2d 241 
( 1956), where the California Supren1e Court found similar 
facts sufficient to show consent. 
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Finally, since there was consent to the search, during 
which Exhibits 2 and 3 were seized, and since Exhibit 4 
was not the subject of search and seizure, and since these 
three exhibits were admitted in evidence as coming from 
the burglary, and adding to these facts the defendant's 
admission of theft from Harmon City, it is difficult to see 
how the admission of Exhibit 1, even if the subject of an 
illegal search and seizure, could have prejudiced the appel-
lant's position where the other evidence was so conclusive 
of guilt. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS ACTION 
ON DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION RE-
QUESTS. 
Appellant finally contends that the court erred in fail-
ing to give the appellant's instructions 3 through 7. These 
instructions do not specifically appear to have been re-
quested during the trial, but merely appear to have been 
filed with the clerk the same day as the trial (R. 15, et 
seq.). The instructions concern the statement made by 
the appellant to the police while in custody. The court ap-
parently did not give any instructions on that matter (R. 
19-34). However, no exceptions to the failure to give any 
instructions appear of record. In the absence of exceptions, 
the appellant cannot complain of any error unless the 
error was so apparent as to deny the appellant a fair trial. 
State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 952 (1936); State v. 
Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P. 2d 504; State v. Hines, 6 
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Utah 2d 126, 307 P. 2d 887 (1957). Since the evidence in 
the instant case, as it was before the jury, showed no pos-
sible claim of coercion or impropriety in taking the state-
ment actually admitted, there was no error in not giving 
the instructions. On direct examination, the sheriff's dep-
uty testified that no promises of any kind were made prior 
to the time the statement was given that was placed before 
the jury. He adhered to that position on cross-examination. 
All that was admitted was that a promise was made, sub-
sequent to the taking of the statement that was placed be-
fore the jury. No evidence appears to rebut that position. 
Consequently, there was no issue of fact or dispute so as 
to require an instruction to be given the jury. The appel-
lant is not entitled to abstract instructions of legal princi-
pals not raised by the evidence, State v. Thompson, 110 
Utah 113, 170 P. 2d 153, and has no basis for complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has raised several claims of error, but 
an analysis of the alleged errors demonstrates that there 
is no basis for reversal. The conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Deputy Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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